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INTRODUCTION

Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the water, the debate over
the meaning and validity of "equality" as a substantive norm has emerged from
the depths to strike again. This time it is Kenneth Simons who has cast the
chum across the surf.
In The Logic of Egalitarian Norms (hereinafter "Logic"), 1 Professor Simons
mounts an ambitious defense of the notion that the pursuit of something called
"equality" can and should guide legal and moral decisionmaking. His article is
partly, though far from entirely, a critique of my own arguments against the
normative validity of what I have called "prescriptive equality.''2 Necessarily,

• Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
I Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000).
2 See Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, llO HARV. L. REv. 12lO (1997)
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Logic also harkens back to Peter Westen's 1982 article The Empty Idea of
Equality,3 the work that first set the equality debate loose in legal academic

waters, and to Westen's subsequent book on the subject.4
In Logic, Simons analyzes the idea of equality more thoroughly than any
legal scholar since Westen. The article's professed purpose is to defend
egalitarian norms against my attacks, Westen's, and to a lesser extent others',
but in doing so Simons fashions a comprehensive and thoughtful positive
account of what egalitarian norms are and how they operate in moral and legal
decisionmaking.
I agree with many of Simons' conclusions, although I do not always agree
with the ways in which he reaches them. My focus in this responsive essay,
however, will be (not surprisingly) on our disagreements. In Part I, I attempt
to clear up some potential confusion about the nature of the "prescriptive
equality" that I have attacked, with the goals of more sharply delineating the
scope of disagreement between Simons and myself and of setting the stage for
the arguments in the succeeding Parts. In Part II, I proceed to our areas of
primary disagreement, beginning with a fundamental conceptual dispute about
what "treatment" of a person means. There are, I contend, two alternative
ways to conceive of treatment, an "outcome-focused" way and an "holistic"
way. I defend the latter, and then, in Part III, I explain how the outcomefocused conception, which I believe is too narrow, distorts Simons'
assessments of many of my arguments.
I. DEONTOLOGICAL VERSUS CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES OF EQUALITY

In a revealing footnote in Logic, Simons asserts: "Peters apparently assumes
that equality rights, to be genuine, must be deontological. But he does not
explain his assumption."5 Although one might quibble with his phrasing,
Simons is basically correct here. I do assume that equality rights (or, more
precisely, norms of what I have called "prescriptive equality" 6) have
deontological foundations, at least in the fullest sense in which such norms are
defended by egalitarians, and I have not yet explained that assumption. I will

(hereinafter Equality); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity,
and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996) (hereinafter Consistency).
3 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
4 PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF
"EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).
5 Simons, supra note 1, at 713 n.73 (citation omitted).
6 See Peters, Equality, supra note 2, passim. As Joshua Sarnoff has pointed out, see
Joshua D. Sarnoff, I Come to Praise Morality, Not to Bury It, 84 IOWA L. REV. 819, 819 n.2
(1999), I did not coin the phrase "prescriptive equality," despite my earlier attempt to take
credit (or blame) for it, see Christopher J. Peters, Slouching Towards Equality, 84 IOWA L.
REv. 801, 801 n.4 (1999). Sarnoff apparently credits Professor Simons with originating the
term, see Sarnoff, supra, but in fact Peter Westen appears to have used it first, see WESTEN,
supra note 4, at 59-92.

2000]

OUTCOMES, REASONS, AND EQUALITY

1097

do so now, and then I will explain further why the deontological foundations of
prescriptive equality matter, in general and in particular as applied to Simons'
arguments.
A. "Prescriptive Equality" as a Deontological Norm
I have in the past made the following assertion:
Egalitarians believe that prescriptive equality in its fullest sense means
just this: Identically situated people are entitled to be treated identically
merely because they are identically situated. Put another way, true
prescriptive equality is the principle that the bare fact that a person has
been treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for treating another,
identically situated person in the same way.?
This definition of prescriptive equality is unavoidably deontological; that is, it
defines the principle of prescriptive equality as requiring equal treatment
merely because of the fact of equal situation, without regard to the
consequences that equal treatment might produce or avoid. So defined, the
demand for prescriptive equality just "is"; it arises not from a desire to achieve
the best state of affairs or otherwise "do good" in the world, but simply from a
belief that pursuing prescriptive equality is the right thing to do, that equal
treatment is a good in itself. Such a demand stands in contrast to a
consequentialist conception of prescriptive equality, which would "assign no
inherent value to [equal treatment] itself," but rather would "value [equal
treatment] only to the extent that [equal treatment] serves justice-related
ends."8
Let me illustrate the deontological nature of prescriptive equality as I have
defined it, and distinguish it from a consequentialist notion of equality, by
borrowing and modifying an example used by Simons.9 Suppose I have two
children, Emily and Andy, who are equally entitled to have dessert after eating
their dinner. Suppose Emily finishes dinner first, and I allow her to have
dessert. Next, Andy finishes his dinner and asks for dessert. While Andy has
been finishing up his peas, I have come to regret my decision to give Emily
dessert; the dessert (chocolate cake, let's say) is high in calories and fat and in
sugar content, leading to tooth decay, and I now feel 1 made a mistake in
allowing Emily to eat it. When Andy requests his dessert, the question for me
becomes: Does the fact that I allowed Emily to have dessert in some way give
me a reason to allow Andy to have dessert as well, given that both are equally
entitled to dessert, but given also that I now believe letting Emily have dessert
was a mistake?
There are two types of reason why 1 might think the answer is "yes." The
first type of reason, the deontological type, is that it would (I might think) be

7

8
9

Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1223 (emphasis in original).
Peters, Consistency, supra note 2, at 2040.
See Simons, supra note I, at 706.
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inherently wrong, or unjust, to deny dessert to Andy after having allowed it to
identically situated Emily. I need not think such a deontological reason is
conclusive, that is, that it trumps or blocks out all contrary reasons (although I
may think this); I may think merely that there would be some amount of
inherent wrongness in denying Andy his dessert, having already allowed it to
Emily.
Such a reason is deontological because it has nothing to do with the possible
consequences of denying, or of allowing, Andy his dessert. It may be that
Andy is an exceptionally mature and reasonable child who will not protest or
harbor any resentment if, after explaining my error in giving dessert to Emily, I
tell him he can't have any. If so, then my denial of dessert to Andy may not
have any adverse consequences. But if I am sympathetic to a deontological
type of reason for treating the two children equally, then I may choose to give
dessert to Andy even if doing so would bring no benefits and if not doing so
would cause no harm.
The second type of reason I may have for giving Andy his dessert, despite
my conviction that giving dessert to Emily was a mistake, is a consequentialist
type of reason: I may believe that equal treatment will (or may) avoid some
consequence I would like to avoid or produce some consequence I would like
to produce. For instance, I may believe that giving dessert to Andy will
preserve peace at the dinner table and prevent Andy's resentment of me and his
sister. Or I may believe that giving dessert to Andy, even after explaining my
regret about giving dessert to Emily, will encourage both children to view me
as fair and impartial and thus will increase their respect for me.
As with the deontological reason, 1 need not think these or any other
consequentialist reasons for equal treatment are conclusive, trumping or
blocking out all contrary reasons (although I may think they are). But if I view
them as reasons for acting, it is not because of a conviction that equal treatment
is inherently the right thing to do, but because of a belief that equal treatment
will, or may, produce good consequences or avoid bad ones.
Note that if I act based on the deontological type of reason described
above----or even if I don't ultimately act based on it, but simply consider it
among the balance of reasons for acting-I am acting pursuant to prescriptive
equality as I have defined that term. That is, I am acting based (at least in part)
on a belief that identically situated people are entitled to be treated identically
merely because they are identically situated, not because of any consequences
that might arise from treating them that way. In giving dessert to Andy, or in
treating my (erroneous) allowance of dessert to Emily as a reason to give
dessert to Andy, I am acting upon the principle that the bare fact that a person
(here, Emily) has been treated in a certain way is a reason in itselffor treating
another, identically situated person (Andy) in the same way. In this sense,
prescriptive equality (again, as I have defined it) is an unequivocally
deontological concept; it is a principle that provides a reason for equal
treatment wholly without regard to the consequences of such treatment.
Accordingly, if I act based on (or based in part on) the consequentialist type
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of reason described above, then I am not acting pursuant to prescnptIve
equality. The result of my action may be equal treatment, and I may even
describe the normative reason for my action as involving "equality," but I am
not applying or following the principle of prescriptive equality, as I have
defined it. I am not treating Andy the same as Emily merely because Emily
and Andy are identically entitled (or, as the case may be, not entitled) to
dessert. Rather, I am treating Andy the same as Emily for the purpose of
avoiding domestic strife, of fostering my children's high opinion of my
fairness, or of producing some other good consequence or avoiding some other
bad one. lO
B. Why Deontology?

The explanation in the previous section suggests one response to Simons'
demand that I explain my "assumption" of prescriptive equality's

10 I should clarify here what I now see may be a potentially misleading use of the phrase
"merely because" in my definition of prescriptive equality. To say that, on the
deontological view, one treats people equally "merely because" they are equally entitled is
not to foreclose the possibility of acting based on some combination of the deontological
and the consequentialist view. For example, I may decide to give Andy dessert both
because I think unequal treatment is inherently wrong and because I think it would produce
bad consequences. My treatment of Andy in such a case would, it is true, not be "merely
because" he and Emily are identically entitled to dessert. But the deontological component
of my decision would be attributable to the mere fact of their identical entitlement-would
be "merely because" they are identically entitled--even though the consequentialist
component of my decision would be attributable entirely to my desire to produce or avoid
certain anticipated effects of the decision.
In this way, a norm of equal treatment, whether it is deontological or consequentialist in
nature, may (in Kent Greenawalt's terminology) either "reinforce" or "pull against" other
norms or reasons for action in any particular case. See Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive
Equality": Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1269 (1997). There are some
instances in Professor Simons' article in which he seems to attribute to me a contrary view:
that the deontological grounding of prescriptive equality implies conclusive force, such that
equal treatment is the inevitable result in any case in which prescriptive equality applies (or
would be the inevitable result, if prescriptive equality were a valid moral norm). For
example, Simons critiques my supposed view "that precedential [what I call "prescriptive"]
equality is a universal, and significant, principle" by pointing out that "[n]ot every case of
incorrect beneficence under a rule deserves multiplication [according to prescriptive
equality]." Simons, supra note I, at 736. But I do not assume that a believer in prescriptive
equality would be under a duty to replicate incorrect treatment (beneficent or not) in every
case in which prescriptive equality applies; I assume only that prescriptive equality will
provide one reason for replicating incorrect treatment, a reason that may (or may not) be
outweighed in any given case by competing reasons against replicating that treatment. See,
e.g., Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1227 ("[A] prescriptive egalitarian ... need only
assert that the bare fact of the treatment of an identically situated person is among the
criteria that should apply in deciding how to treat someone. [He or she] need not believe
that prescriptive equality is always, or ever, a trump card.") (emphasis in original).
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deontological basis.. There are two general ways to justify equal treatment, a
deontological way and a consequentialist way. In defining prescriptive
equality as I have and then attacking it as I have, I am simply challenging the
former, deontological way to justify equal treatment. I have nothing to say
about the latter, consequentialist way. Far from "assuming" that no valid
consequentialist justifications for equal treatment exist, I am removing the rival
type of justification, deontology, from the table, leaving the field open for
equal treatment motivated by consequentialism. 11
Thus Simons misreads me when he accuses me of "abjur[ing] the concept of
a right to equal treatment."12 I am not against such a concept in the abstract,
and more particularly, I am not (necessarily) against that concept when it is
grounded in consequentialist considerations. As I suggest above, there may be
very good reasons to treat Emily and Andy equally, even faced with the belief
that my treatment of Emily was a mistake. More generally, there may be very
good reasons to insist upon equal treatment by, for example, government of
different individuals or of different classes of individuals. My point has been
only that these good reasons for equal treatment must be consequentialist
reasons, not deontological ones. 13
Someone (perhaps Simons) still may argue, however, that my choice to
target only deontological equality is arbitrary or, worse, that it is intended to
set up a straw man that can be knocked down impressively but meaninglessly.
This objection would have force if it were true that people rarely or never
adopt, or act pursuant to, a deontologica1 conception of equality. I don't think
there is any way to test this proposition empirically, but my strong feeling is
that many, perhaps most, people do hold a deontological conception of equality
that manifests itself in certain cases. Let me try to support this intuition with
an example.
Return to Simons' "dessert" case, with a variation on the facts. Suppose
Emily eats dinner early in order to leave in time for her drama club rehearsal
that evening. After dinner, she asks for dessert and I give it to her. Soon after
Emily leaves for her rehearsal, Andy returns home from soccer practice and
eats dinner. Now Andy requests dessert. There is no way (let us suppose) for
either Andy or Emily to know whether the other has been given dessert, so (let
us further suppose) there would be no adverse consequences of denying dessert
to Andy, haven (mistakenly) given it to Emily. Assuming Emily and Andy are
identically situated with respect to their entitlements to dessert, is there
nonetheless some reason, however small, to give dessert to Andy? If one

11 In fact I have directly challenged one category of consequentialist justification for
equal treatment: equal treatment based on the fact (and the effects) of moral uncertainty.
See Peters, supra note 6.
12 Simons, supra note 1, at 697.
13 More accurately, my point has been that to the extent reasons for equal treatment are
or may be justified by deontological norms, they are not norms of prescriptive equality.
See, for example, my discussion of antidiscrimination norms in section III.A, infra.
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believes that there is such a reason, then one must hold, in some measure, a
deontological conception of equality.
My view is that many people would admit that they do think there is some
remaining reason, decisive or not, for giving dessert to Andy. I do not know if
Simons would make such an admission-he never directly addresses the issue
in his article-but my strong suspicion from the tenor of his piece is that he
would, that he believes there is some remaining reason (consequences aside)
for treating Andy the same as Emily.
Unlike Simons, Kent Greenawalt has made explicit his view that equal
treatment has a deontological grounding in some cases,14 and it might be
helpful briefly to engage Greenawalt's thoughtful analysis here. Greenawalt
posits that equal treatment in certain circumstances is justified as a response to:
[T]he admittedly debatable premise that, at least in our culture, and
probably in Western culture in general, the feeling that one should not
receive worse treatment than a perceived equal is fairly deep and strong
. . .. If this assumption is correct, then one can reasonably expect good
decisionmakers to accede to these feelings to some degree. IS
Greenawalt correctly anticipates how I would reply to this argument: "even if
decisionmakers rightly accede to feelings about equality to some degree, they
do so for consequentialist reasons, not because the [deontological] principle of
prescriptive equality is valid."16 But Greenawalt is not convinced that this
reply is good enough. The reply that, "after all, only consequences are at
issue,"17 Greenawalt contends, fails to acknowledge that the egalitarian
feelings people are likely to have seem themselves to be deontologically
grounded:
The equal who ends up being treated worse than another often feels
wronged, quite apart from whether the disparate but otherwise deserved
treatment places him at any intrinsic disadvantage in comparison with
what his condition would have been if he had been the only individual
involved and received the same (deserved) treatment. . .. Even if the
decisionmaker makes a concession to egalitarian feelings on a purely
consequential basis, the motivation to make this concession still stems
from the deontological sense of injustice, however "misplaced," of
affected equals. IS
In other words, Andy, if he discovers the disparity in his treatment as
compared to Emily's, will feel "wronged," even though he knows he would not
have deserved to have cake if he were an only child (or if he had been the first
one to finish dinner). My decision to give Andy his (undeserved) cake in order
See Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 1283-89.
Id. at 1283-84.
16 Id. at 1284.
17 Id.
181d.
14

15
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to placate his feelings implicitly recognizes that those feelings are, ultimately,
deontological in nature. In this sense, equal treatment for consequentialist
reasons is in fact built upon deontological conceptions of equality.
I agree with Greenawalt here, and his argument undercuts the suggestion
(which I have constructively, and perhaps unfairly, attributed to Simons) that
deontological "prescriptive equality" is mostly a red herring distracting us
from the more important consequentialist reasons for equal treatment.
Greenawalt appears to believe, as I do, that the consequentialist reasons we
may have in a given case for treating people equally often will hinge on
"feelings" (or attitudes, or beliefs, etc.) of certain people-most likely, but
perhaps not always, those being subjected to the relevant treatment-that equal
treatment is demanded by some deontological sense of justice. If this is so,
then arguments that call into question the validity of such deontological
impulses toward equal treatment, arguments like those I have made, also seem
to call into question the correctness of consequentially motivated treatments
designed to placate such deontological impulses. The attack on prescriptive
equality thus extends beyond cases in which the motives for equal treatment
are purely or primarily deontological, to cover as well many cases in which the
motives for equal treatment seem purely or primarily consequentialist.
Of course, one might agree with my conclusion that (deontological)
prescriptive equality is invalid and still believe that people's (misguided)
beliefs in prescriptive equality should sometimes, perhaps often, be respected.
One might, for instance, conclude that I should give dessert to Andy out of
respect for, or at least a desire to placate or avoid, the innate sense of injustice
that might be aroused in Andy should dessert be denied him. On a
consequentialist view, it might be thought that the benefits produced (or the
harms avoided) by placating Andy's admittedly erroneous feelings outweigh
the benefits produced or harms avoided by giving Andy what he (otherwise)
deserves.
I have no argument with this way of thinking, as a general matter. For me,
what is important is to recognize that the rejection of prescriptive equality as a
valid moral norm at least removes one type of reason, potentially a strong one,
for giving Andy the (otherwise undeserved) cake. It also may be important to
recognize that the rejection of prescriptive equality may add a reason for not
giving Andy the cake: namely, the fact that doing so would endorse erroneous
moral beliefs. When Andy complains that he has been treated "unfairly" or
"unequally" with respect to his sister, and when as a consequence I relent and
give him the cake, I run the risk of teaching Andy the moral lesson that
prescriptive equality is a valid aspect of justice, and thus a valid ground for
moral protest. Perhaps in some circumstances it would be best, all things
considered, to take this chance, but surely the risk of endorsing and rewarding
incorrect moral beliefs at least should make me think twice about it.
This point can be generalized, I think, beyond the rather special case of
parents doling out benefits and burdens to their children. Any decisionmaker
who imposes equal treatment out of a desire to placate people's beliefs that
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equal treatment is an inherent good thereby endorses those beliefs (implicitly
or explicitly), or at the very least sends the message that there is some utility to
expressing them. When the decisionmaker is in a position of power-as
decisionmakers, virtually by definition, will be-then such an endorsement
itself might have a powerful effect, nourishing a general belief in invalid
norms. In the face of this risk, I am reluctant to approve Greenawalt's
somewhat tentative conclusion that prescriptive equality should be applied on a
"rule-consequentialist" basis, that is, should be applied as a general rule (albeit
only within certain contexts 19), without consideration of its likely effects in
particular cases, on a theory that doing so will produce the most desirable
consequences in the long run.20 While the costs of endorsing an invalid moral
norm might indeed be outweighed by other criteria in particular cases, I am
skeptical that this will be true in the aggregate.
These somewhat tangential questions aside, the point is that an attack on
what I have called "prescriptive equality," a deontologically grounded norm of
equal treatment, has potentially far-reaching implications for the application of
equal treatment generally. Equal treatment may be justified consequentially,
and my arguments do not directly challenge such justifications. To the extent
that consequentialist justifications are grounded in a desire to placate, avoid, or
otherwise respond to people's deontological egalitarian beliefs, however, my
arguments give us reason to question them.
To what extent are consequentialist justifications of equal treatment
typically grounded in responses to people's (mistaken) deontological beliefs
about equality? It is difficult to say, but it may be revealing that two recent
defenses of equality as a substantive norm (other than Simons') have relied on
justifications that are so grounded. Greenawalt's most recent defense of
equality hinges entirely upon the notion that it is likely to be beneficial, or at
least to avoid harm, to placate people's deontological feelings of injustice
when perceived equals are treated unequally.21 Joshua Sarnoff has similarly
defended equal treatment in consequentialist terms, as a default rule to be
applied in cases of especially salient moral uncertainty in order to circumvent
people's negative reactions to unequal treatment. 22
It is important to note, however, that this type of consequentialist
justification for equal treatment does not exhaust the field. There are valid
consequentialist reasons for consistency of treatment that apply in many cases,
quite apart from the desire to placate or avoid people's feelings of injustice. A

19 Greenawalt has in mind circumstances in which "the people to be treated are
significantly related in some sense, and when the one who may receive worse treatment will
be aware of the better treatment received by his equal." Id. at 1289.
20 See id. at 1286-88.
21 See id.
22 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REv. 377 (1999). For my
response to Sarnoffs essay, see Peters, supra note 6; for Sarnoffs reply to my response, see
Sarnoff, supra note 6.
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salient example is the concern for predictability, which itself is motivated by
concerns for efficiency and perhaps for individual autonomy.
A
decisionmaker-the classic example is a court of law-may think it
advantageous to treat like cases (and thus like people) alike not because of a
bare belief in prescliptive equality, and not from a desire to placate or avoid
feelings inspired by prescriptive equality, but rather from a conviction that
such consistency is beneficial to the planning efforts of those who will be
bound by its decisions. 23 There are other frequently cited reasons along similar
consequentialist lines, including concerns of conserving decisionmaking
resources and constraining decisionmakers' discretion. 24 These kinds of
consequentialist reasons for equal treatment do not depend, directly or
indirectly, on a deontological conception of prescriptive equality, and so as to
them my arguments are simply irrelevant.
C. Deontology, Consequentialism, and The Logic of Egalitarian Norms

The foregoing discussion has a number of implications for Simons' project
in The Logic of Egalitarian Norms. First, it blunts Simons' critique that
prescriptive equality, as I have defined it, is an arbitrarily (or at least unduly)
narrow conception of a norm of equal treatment. There is reason to suppose
that many, perhaps most, people who believe in a norm of equal treatment
ultimately would ground that norm deontologically in some cases (e.g., the
Emily and Andy hypothetical).25 Moreover, what appears to be a significant
category of consequentialist justifications for equal treatment-those
justifications that are responsive in some way to people's innate feelings or
beliefs that unequal treatment is unjust-also are called into question by an
attack on the validity of (deontological) prescriptive equality. If we reject
prescriptive equality, we at least must ask the question whether applying equal
treatment in response to people's unjustified faith in that norm inappropriately
endorses an incorrect moral belief.
Second, the foregoing discussion opens the possibility that Simons and I (or,
more broadly, those who defend and those who reject prescriptive equality)
can agree on certain actual cases. Many of the examples of particular norms of
equal treatment referred to by Simons in Logic can be explained in
consequentialist terms, and as such my attack on prescriptive equality does not
threaten (and is not threatened by) them. For example, Simons frequently
refers to antidiscrimination statutes such as the Age Discrimination in

See, e.g., Peters, Consistency, supra note 2, at 2039 n.26, and sources cited therein.
For brief lists of sources for such concerns in the context of judicial decisionmaking,
see id. at 2039 nn.29, 30.
25 This hypothesis is of course open to argument, and I would be happy to see Simons or
some other egalitarian undercut it by disavowing any impulses toward equal treatment that
do not depend on consequences. My suspicion is that this will be difficult for many or most
egalitarians honestly to do, at least when presented with the facts of a particular case.
23

24
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Employment Act,26 the Equal Pay Act,27 and Title VIPs Such statutes need
not be interpreted as codifications of the principle that likes should be treated
alike merely because of their likeness; they can be justified instead on wholly
consequentialist grounds, as strategies for improving the common good by
removing particular artificial disabilities from certain historically
disadvantaged groups.29 Nothing I have argued gives us any reason to doubt
the validity of these or many other examples of norms of equal treatment that
can similarly be consequentially grounded.
My third point follows closely from my second point. Much of Simons'
argument in Logic, directed as it is to explaining the operation of egalitarian
(and other comparative) norms regardless of how they are grounded
(deontologically or consequentially), neither threatens nor is threatened by my
attack on the validity of prescriptive equality. In fact, I agree with much of
what I will call Simons' descriptive argument. In his Part II, for example,
entitled "What Normative Equality Is," Simons for the most part simply
describes some formal properties of a right to equal treatment without
specifying their normative source. 30 Most or all of what Simons asserts here
would apply equally to prescriptive equality and to consequentially grounded
egalitarian norms. Similarly, Simons' Part IV, "How Normative Equality
Operates in Moral and Legal Analysis," consists mostly of arguments that
might apply to prescriptive equality, to consequentialist equality, or to both.
Simons and I do not disagree on most of these descriptive points.
Indeed, it is a somewhat curious feature of Logic that Simons never, to my
reading, makes clear whether he in fact holds a deontological conception of
equality. Many or most of his examples of egalitarian norms in operation,
from the children's dessert case to antidiscrimination laws, might be explained
either deontologically or consequentially. I may choose to give Andy his cake
because I think failure to do so would work some inherent injustice against
Andy, or I may choose to do so to avoid the unbearable family atmosphere that
might arise if Andy discovers the disparate treatment. Congress may enact
antidiscrimination legislation out of a conviction that group A has a
comparative right to be treated the same as group B, or as a strategic means of
improving relations between groups A and B, reducing inefficiency,
compensating members of group A for past wrongs, or what have you. But the
fact that I might choose equal treatment of Emily and Andy, or that Congress

29 U.S.c. § 621 et seq. (West 2000); see Simons, supra note 1, at 716.
29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq. (West 2000); see Simons, supra note 1, at 716.
28 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq. (West 2000); see Simons, supra note 1, at 714, 732, 768.
29 In fact, my own view of antidiscrimination laws is that they are grounded ultimately in
deontological norms, but that those norms are not norms of prescriptive equality. See infra
section IIl.A.
30 The salient exception is section 11.0, in which Simons traces one type of equality right
to a "fundamental duty of equal respect and concern." See Simons, supra note 1, at 720-23.
I address this argument below. See infra section III.D.
26
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might prohibit disparate treatment of groups A and B, does not alone commit
us to the deontological justifications for those choices, and thus it does not
alone provide any evidence for the validity of prescriptive equality.
There are many other aspects of Simons' arguments in Logic, however, that
do seem directly to challenge a rejection of equality as a deontological norm. I
tum to the more salient of these in Part III. First, however, I set the stage in
Part II by describing two different conceptions of what it means for someone to
be "treated" justly or unjustly, equally or unequally, rightly or wrongly.

II.

OUTCOME-FoCUSED VERSUS HOLISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF TREATMENT

What does it mean for a person to be "treated" in a particular way? This
question turns out to be important in assessing Simons' critiques of my
arguments, as I demonstrate in Part III.
Imagine one conception of treatment, which I will call outcome-focused. On
an outcome-focused conception of treatment (To)' the treatment a person
receives is measured just by comparing that person's material circumstances
before and after he has received the benefit or burden (or, more broadly, by
comparing the way the physical world looks before and after the person has
received the benefit or burden). So, for example, if I allow Andy to have
dessert, Andy's treatment is simply the fact that he has been allowed to have
dessert. My reasons for allowing Andy to have dessert are not part of his
treatment.
Now contrast another conception of treatment, which I will call holistic. On
an holistic conception of treatment (TH ), the treatment a person receives is
measured by comparing the way the physical world looks before and after the
person has received a benefit or burden, and by inquiring into the reasons
relied upon by the person administering the benefit or burden in deciding to
administer it. So, for example, if I allow Andy to have dessert because I want
to avoid his protests ifI deny it, Andy's treatment is the fact that he has been
allowed to have dessertfor the reason that I want to avoid his protests if I deny
i.t.
On an holistic conception of treatment, the same outcomes need not imply
the same treatments. So, for example, if I allow Andy to have dessert on
Tuesday because I think he is justly entitled to it, regardless of whether his
sister Emily received it, and then I allow Andy to have dessert on Wednesday
to avoid his protests, despite my belief that he is not justly entitled to it, my
treatment of Andy on Tuesday is different from my treatment of Andy on
Wednesday. As another, more relevant example, if I refuse to give Emily
dessert out of concern for her health, but I refuse to give Andy dessert in
retaliation for some minor transgression the previous day, my treatment of
Emily is different from my treatment of Andy.31
31 Technically, the principle of prescriptive equality, or indeed a right to equal treatment
however grounded, could not operate under an holistic conception of treatment as thus
defined, because the reason one would have for treating person B "the same" as person A
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Why would anyone adopt TH , the holistic conception of treatment, which at
ftrst glance seems rather awkward and open-ended? The adoption of TH makes
sense as a way to sort out what I think are common intuitions about the relative
justice or injustice, or rightness or wrongness, of particular treatments.
Suppose, for example, that two people, A and B, apply for a job. The employer
refuses to hire A because he believes A is not qualified for the job. The
employer refuses to hire B because B is black, and the employer does not like
black people. A and B have been "treated" equally according to To, the
outcome-focused conception of treatment. But my guess is that most people
would conclude that A and B have in fact been treated in some way differently,
despite the fact that both have been denied the job. If so, then most people
hold an holistic conception of treatment; they would adopt Tw
There are many similar examples. A judge dismisses case A because she
believes the law requires it, then dismisses identical case B because she has
received a bribe. A voter chooses candidate A based upon careful research but
chooses candidate B based upon the toss of a coin. A teacher flunks student A
because the student performed poorly and flunks student B purely out of
malice. I think it likely that in all these cases, and in many others, many or
most people would think the recipients have been treated somehow differently,
despite receiving exactly the same benefits or burdens.
Indeed, many legal rules that might be interpreted as incorporating norms of
equal treatment adopt holistic conceptions of treatment. As Simons notes,32
plaintiffs alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII may recover by
demonstrating a discriminatory motive (a reason) for their disadvantageous
treatment (an outcome);33 discriminatory treatment under the statute thus is
deftned holistically, to include both outcomes and reasons. 34 Even more

(the mere fact of sameness under prescnptIve equality; some prediction of likely
consequences under a consequentialist theory of equal treatment) would render the
"treatment" of B different from that of A. Thus, the holistic conception of treatment, Til'
should be understood to exclude reasons of equality, that is, reasons that turn in some way
on the treatment given another or to which another is entitled.
32 See Simons, supra note 1, at 714 n.74.
33 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (describing Title VII
plaintiff s burden of establishing prima facie case of intentional discrimination and
employer's burden of overcoming prima facie case with evidence of nondiscriminatory
motive).
34 As Simons also notes, see Simons, supra note I, at n.74 and accompanying text, a
Title VII plaintiff may recover under certain circumstances merely by demonstrating a
"disparate impact" (an outcome). See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k) (defining an "unlawful
employment practice based on disparate impact" where the plaintiff demonstrates that the
employer has used "a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity"). In such cases, however, evidence of egregiously disparate impact can
be seen as a proxy for more direct evidence of discriminatory motive, where such direct
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saliently, evidence of both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect is
required in litigation under the Equal Protection Clause;35 a plaintiff cannot
recover at all unless she can demonstrate discriminatory treatment, defined
holistically.
Regardless of whether TH enjoys widespread acceptance, however, it must be
accepted by someone seeking to defend prescriptive equality. Prescriptive
equality, remember, is a deontological norm; it requires (or provides a reason
for) equal treatment merely because two or more recipients are equally
situated. As such, in order to know whether the norm of prescriptive equality
has been violated, one must inquire into reasons for treatment. Suppose
applicant A is given a job and applicant B is turned down. Was the reason for
the difference in treatment an honest assessment by the employer that A was
qualified while B was not? If so, prescriptive equality hasn't been violated,
because A and B were not equally situated after all. But if the employer's
decision was based on criteria that had nothing to do with job performancesay, the fact that B is black-then the principle of prescriptive equality has
been violated: B has been treated differently from A, despite their identical
situation.
A believer in prescriptive equality, then, must accept that reasons matter and
that the same outcomes may reflect different treatments depending upon the
reasons for them. He or she must adopt TH , the holistic conception of
treatment. This is precisely the conception of treatment that I have adopted in
my previous critiques of prescriptive equality.36
Of course, an holistic conception of treatment will not always be easy to
apply. Often it will be easier to tell whether two outcomes are (at least
roughly) the same-both Emily and Andy got dessert-than to discover what

evidence is particularly difficult to uncover and where it is difficult to explain the particular
outcome without assuming it is the product of discriminatory reasons. See infra notes 37-41
and accompanying text.
35 See Washington v. Davis, 429 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting "disparate impact" claim
brought pursuant to "equal protection component" of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
on grounds that discriminatory purpose is required for equal protection violation in
employment context). The same requirement has been applied in contexts other than
employment, including public housing, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 419 U.S. 252 (1977), and the death penalty, see McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
36 In particular, my definition of nonegalitarian justice, the construct that I have used to
demonstrate prescriptive equality's invalidity and to explain the supposed effects of
prescriptive equality by other means, incorporates an holistic conception of treatment:
Nonegalitarian justice is "treatment of a person in accordance with the net effect of all the
relevant criteria and only the relevant criteria, provided that considerations of [prescriptive]
equality cannot be relevant criteria." Peters, Equality, supra note 1, at 1228 (emphasis
altered); see also Peters, Consistency, supra note 1, at 2050-55. By making the criteria used
in decisionmaking part of my definition of justice, I have adopted a conception of (just)
treatment that makes reference to reasons ("criteria") for treatment.
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motivated those outcomes. This difficulty can prove fatal to plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause37 or pursuant to a "disparate treatment" theory under antidiscrimination
statutes. 38 Sometimes a reasonable response to this difficulty is to use
outcomes as proxies for reasons, presuming that certain egregious outcomes
could not have been produced by innocent motives. In my view, this is the
primary explanation behind multi-tiered review under the Equal Protection
Clause: Classifications with an established history of illicit motivation are
assessed according to strict scrutiny,39 classifications with a mixed history are
assessed according to intermediate scrutiny,40 and classifications with no
history are assessed according to rational basis scrutiny.41 But the difficulty of
establishing reasons for outcomes does not preclude adopting an holistic
conception of treatment, any more than the difficulty of proving discriminatory
motives precludes having an Equal Protection Clause.

III. THE OUTCOME-FoCUSED CONCEPTION IN THE LOGlC OF EGAUTARIAN
NORMS

Simons adopts an outcome-focused conception of treatment at crucial points
in his arguments, particularly in his critiques of my own arguments against
prescriptive equality. In this Part, I explore three of Simons' strongest
challenges to my arguments and one affirmative claim Simons makes in
support of prescriptive equality. All four arguments, I contend, are tainted
either by Simons' adoption of an outcome-focused conception of treatment or
by his misunderstanding of the implications of an holistic conception.

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
38 See, e.g., Jenkins v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 973 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (granting summary judgment for employer in Title VII case where plaintiff failed to
produce prima facie evidence of discriminatory motive); Brown v. Stone Container Corp.,
967 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (same); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075
(E.D. Okla. 1997) (same).
39 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to
classification based on status as a "colored person"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (Japanese descent). There are of course many other cases in point. I should note
that strict scrutiny has not been limited to classifications that have what may fairly be
described as a history of illicit motivation; the Court has applied it as well to affirmative
action programs designed to benefit historically disadvantaged minorities. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
40 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 419 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny
to classification based on gender); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (same).
41 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying
rational basis test to classification based on mental retardation); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (sale of milk in plastic containers); U.S. Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (years of service with railroad); New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 468 (1979) (methodone use); U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (familial relationships within household).
37
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A. Antidiscrimination Norms and the "Single Person Reductio" Argument
I have argued elsewhere that norms against discrimination based upon race
or other irrelevant characteristics are not norms of prescriptive equality:
Someone who supports racial equality is not saying that an AfricanAmerican, for instance, is entitled to a certain treatment just because a
Caucasian-American has been treated that way. Someone who supports
racial equality is, in fact, saying that the characteristic of a person's race,
by itself, is not a relevant criterion upon which to base that person's
treatment-that nonegalitarian justice demands that the bare fact of race
not playa role in how a person is treated. 42
If norms against discrimination are based on a conception of nonegalitarian
justice that prohibits treatment of people according to the irrelevant
characteristic of race, then such norms are violated even when the person being
treated is the only person being treated-even, that is, when the person being
treated according to race is not being treated disadvantageously (or
advantageously) with respect to another person.43 A person who is not hired
because of his race is the victim of illicit discrimination, even if he is the only
one to apply for the job and no one else ever is hired. As such, in Simons'
lexicon, antidiscrimination norms do not create comparative rights; they do not
condition the appropriate treatment of one person upon the treatment given
another.
Simons disagrees, asserting that rights against race (and other types of)
discrimination are indeed comparative rights. His argument appears to have
two prongs, which I will address one at a time.
1. Discrimination, Comparisons, and Treatments
Simons' first argument purporting to show that antidiscrimination rights are
comparative consists of two parts. First, Simons notes that discrimination
supposes a comparison between or among two or more people or groups of
people, between "certain persons or classes"44 (usually minority groups or
members of minority groups) and other persons or classes. Second, he notes
that discrimination results in the disparate distribution of benefits or
burdens-not simply "tangible benefits or ... status" but "respect and esteem"
as well. 45 If we combine these two prongs into one, Simons seems to be
asserting that antidiscrimination rights are comparative because they make the
entitlements of one person or class depend upon the benefits or burdens given
to another person or class.
Simons is wrong in classifying antidiscrimination rights as comparative in
this way, however. A comparative right is a right whose "point. " is to

42

43
44
45

Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1258-59 (emphasis in original).
See Peters, Consistency, supra note 2, at 1220, where I first made this argument.
Simons, supra note 1, at 710.
[d. at 739-40.
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equalize the treatments of different persons or to create some other relative
relationship in those treatments."46 It is thus a right that makes one person's
entitlement contingent upon what another person receives or is entitled to
receive. The entitlement of a person not to be denied a benefit (or saddled with
a burden) based upon his or her race, however, is not contingent upon what
another person receives or is entitled to receive. An applicant has a right not to
be denied a job because he is black, even if no other, non-black person is given
that job. The applicant's right against race-based treatment is absolute, not
contingent.
Why then does Simons think it is a comparative right? I believe there are
two sources of the confusion. The first is the fact that treatment according to
race, or any form of discrimination, does indeed suppose a comparison. But
what it supposes is a descriptive comparison, not a normative one. The racist
who refuses to hire a black person is indeed "comparing" black people with his
ideal, white people; the fact of race would have no meaning if there were only
one race, in which case treating people on the basis of race would be akin to
treating people on the basis of being human, or of having DNA. In prohibiting
race discrimination, we are denying the relevance of this descriptive
comparison; we are saying that the fact of a person's race, by itself, is
irrelevant to whether a person should be (for example) given a job. 47 But in
prohibiting race discrimination, we are not making a normative comparison of
the type implicit in comparative rights; we are not saying that the proper way
to treat (say) black people is somehow contingent on the way white people are
(or should be) treated.
To illustrate this point, suppose a southern city maintains whites-only public
swimming pools during the 1960s.48 When ordered by a federal court to cease
operating segregated pools, the city closes them rather than integrate them. If
antidiscrimination rights really are comparative, this solution is fine and dandy:
The appropriate treatment of the city's black citizens is contingent on how its
white citizens are treated, and because whites have not been given any benefit
denied to blacks, the black citizens' (comparative) antidiscrimination rights
have not been violated.
Many people, however, would not be satisfied with this result (despite the
fact that five Justices of the Supreme Court apparently were). Many, myself
included, are likely to believe that some antidiscrimination norm has been
violated, even though whites have not been given any benefit denied to blacks.
The reason for this remaining unease, I submit, is that the city's black citizens
still have been denied a benefit because of their race; rather than open its

[d. at 709.
We may also be enforcing a consequentialist strategy to prevent harmful effects of
race discrimination, and perhaps to remediate harmful effects that have occurred in the past.
I discuss this possibility infra in section III.A.2.
48 This example is based on Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). Simons briefly
discusses Palmer at Simons, supra note 1, at n.98 and accompanying text.
46

47
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public pools to blacks, the city has chosen to close them. No benefits or
burdens have been distributed unequally, but still the wrong remains. The
antidiscrimination norm in play must not then be comparative.
Note how this conclusion ties into the distinction between outcome-focused
and holistic conceptions of treatment. One who thinks that the discrimination
problem has been solved by the city's uniform closing of the pools adopts an
outcome-focused concepti'on of treatment: He or she he looks at the fact that
neither race can use the public swimming pools and stops there, without
inquiring into the reasons for the decision to close the pools. But one who
thinks that the discrimination problem remains, despite this superficial
"equality" of treatment, adopts an holistic conception of treatment: He or she
realizes that the city's black citizens have been treated according to their race
no less by the closure of the pools than by their operation on a segregated
basis.49
In erroneously classifying antidiscrimination rights as comparative, then,
Simons is (perhaps without realizing it) relying on an outcome-focused
conception of treatment. This is the second source of confusion in Simons'
critique of the "single person reductio" argument: Simons assumes that
antidiscrimination rights are comparative because they sometimes seem to
require that members of disadvantaged groups be given the same benefits or
spared the same burdens-that they be ensured the same outcomes-that
members of advantaged groups are given or spared. What antidiscrimination
rights really require, however, is that members of disadvantaged groups not be
treated according to the irrelevant trait that has unjustly produced their
disadvantage-race, gender, sexual orientation, or whatever. When members
of a disadvantaged group have been denied a benefit based upon that trait and
that benefit has been extended to people without the trait, then
antidiscrimination rights require either that the benefit be extended to the
disadvantaged group or that it be revoked from the advantaged group-not

49 Simons attempts to explain the continued wrong perpetrated by the city in uniformly
closing the pools as a product of the "stigma" closure of the pools imposed upon blacks.
See Simons, supra note 1, at 721. On this view, closing the pools to all still produces an
unequal outcome: It distributes the burden of a stigma (or the benefit of respect) unequally
to blacks and whites. The problem with this argument is that the idea of a "stigma" can't
fully explain the wrongness of the city's action; eliminating the stigma would not eliminate
the wrong. Suppose, for example. that the decision to close the pools was made behind
closed doors, in complete secrecy, with no one but the members of the city council privy to
the reasons for it. Suppose further that the city was able to supply a completely convincing
neutral explanation for the decision to close the pools. such that no member of the black
community felt stigmatized by that decision. If the decision nonetheless was actually
motivated by racial bias. it would still be wrong-unjust--even if no one knew its real
motivation and thus no stigma was created by the decision. The source of that injustice is
the fact that the city has actually treated its black citizens solely according to their race. not
the possibility that black citizens would feel stigmatized by that treatment if they knew
about it.
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because such rights are comparative, but simply because these are the only
possible ways to discontinue treatment of the disadvantaged group according
to the prohibited trait.
Moreover, "leveling up" the benefits-extending them to everyone-often
will be the only real choice, because, as in the swimming pool case, "leveling
down" frequently will be motivated by considerations of the same
impermissible criterion that produced the disparate treatment in the first place.
The city's decision to close the pools rather than integrate them was motivated
by racism, and thus was no better than its original decision to operate the pools
on a segregated basis. Only by "leveling up" and keeping the pools open on an
integrated basis could the city avoid race-based treatment. This fact, I think,
largely explains the phenomenon, observed by Simons,5o that many
antidiscrimination statutes require "leveling up" as a remedy.
In sum, then, the fact that antidiscrimination rights involve comparisons, and
the fact that they require equal distribution of benefits or burdens, are red
herrings. A descriptive comparison is indeed what causes discrimination, that
is, treatment according to an irrelevant criterion like race. But the remedy for
such discrimination does not itself require a comparison; it requires only that
people not be treated according to particular irrelevant criteria. This
requirement in tum will produce equal distribution of benefits or burdens. But
such an equal distribution is not the point of antidiscrimination rights, and thus
such rights are not comparative.
2. Discrimination and Irrelevance

The second prong of Simons' critique of the "single person reductio"
argument is that a "reduction" of antidiscrimination norms to norms against
treatment according to irrelevant criteria "trivialize[s] the reasons why racial
discrimination is illegal"51:
Racial discrimination expresses a profound disrespect for the status of a
minority group, but the use of an arbitrary or irrelevant criterion, without
more, has no such meaning or effect. Among other things, Peters' view
does not permit us to explain why discrimination against blacks might
plausibly be seen as more troublesome than preferential treatment of
blacks. 52
Here Simons simply misunderstands the nature of my argument that
antidiscrimination norms can be explained entirely by conceptions of
nonegalitarian justice. Nonegalitarian justice is "treatment of a person in
accordance with the net effect of all the relevant criteria [other than
prescriptive equality] and only the relevant criteria."53 Race discrimination

Simons, supra note 1, at 716.
slId. at 738.
52Id.
53 Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1228 (emphasis omitted).
50
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violates most conceptions of nonegalitarian justice because it is treatment of a
person based upon an irrelevant criterion: that person's race. AffIrmative
action does not necessarily violate these conceptions of nonegalitarian justice,
because it is not treatment of a person based upon an irrelevant criterion (the
bare fact of that person's race). Rather, it is treatment of a person based upon
(what many believe to be) relevant criteria: the need to redress historical
discrimination, the need to protect against continued discrimination, the
benefits of diversity, or the like. Thus my "view"-that antidiscrimination
norms are explicable by reference entirely to some nonegalitarian conception
of justice-does indeed "permit us to explain why discrimination against
blacks might plausibly be seen as more troublesome than preferential treatment
of blacks." Preferential treatment of blacks might plausibly be based upon
relevant criteria, while discrimination against blacks never plausibly could be.
Simons' critique of this argument implicitly acknowledges that reasons for
treatment matter; it implicitly accepts an holistic conception of treatment. But
Simons has too thin a notion of what might count as reasons for treatment.
Taking race into account in deciding how to treat someone need not involve
reliance on irrelevant criteria (that is, reasons) for treatII1ent, because the fact
of a person's race may trigger a set of entirely relevant criteria for treatment.
As such, any conception of nonegalitarian justice that is at all nuanced will be
fully capable of distinguishing between impermissible discrimination and
permissible, even mandatory, remediation or prevention of discrimination.
Reliance on a supposed norm of prescriptive equality, or on some other
comparative conception of rights, is entirely unnecessary to support such a
distinction. Worse, it is affirmatively harmful, because it suggests, as Simons
does,54 that unjustified race-based treatments often or always can be remedied
simply by "leveling down" the benefits (or "leveling up" the burdens)
distributed pursuant to those treatments-simply by closing the pools to all
rather than operating them on an integrated basis.
B. The Distribution of Scarce Indivisible Resources
A special problem with respect to equal treatment might be thought to arise
in cases of scarce indivisible resources55--cases in which there is not enough
54 See, e.g., Simons, supra note 1, at 722 ("[W]e should not shrink from [the] conclusion
[that "leveling down" may be an appropriate remedy]. It is indeed what equality permits.");
see id. at 754 (satisfying equality by denying a benefit to all "is not absurd but perfectly
defensible"). Simons' endorsement of "leveling down" as a remedy for inequality seems to
me deeply counterintuitive, at least in many contexts. Explaining antidiscrimination and
similar norms by reference solely to nonegalitarian conceptions of justice, incorporated
within an holistic conception of treatment, seems to better support the intuition that denying
a benefit to all rather than extending it to all is wrong where the denial is motivated by the
same pernicious criterion that caused the original disparity.
55 I have in the past referred to such cases as involving "scarcity of indivisible
treatments." See Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1237-43. I substitute the word
"resources" instead of "treatments" here to avoid the impression that I am assuming an
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of a particular benefit or resource to go around among those who are equally
entitled to it, and there is no way to give each equally entitled person less than
a full unit of the resource. The example I have used before is that of eleven
shipwreck survivors competing for space in a lifeboat that safely holds only ten
people. 56 There is not enough of the resource (space in the lifeboat) to fully
satisfy each person's (by hypothesis equal) entitlement to it, and it is not
possible to give any person less than a full place in the lifeboat. The resource,
space in the lifeboat, is scarce and indivisible.
Simons and I agree on the appropriate outcome in such a case: Each person
should have a 10/11 chance at a place in the lifeboat, to be determined by
drawing lots or some other random decisionmaking mechanism. 57 But we
disagree about why this outcome is appropriate. I have offered two alternative
explanations, which amount to the same thing. The first explanation, in brief,
is that the 10111 chance is demanded by considering the relevant criteria of
nonegalitarian justice applicable to the case. One such criterion is the
(descriptive) fact that only ten survivors can fit in the lifeboat; another is the
(normative) unacceptability, on most reasonable conceptions of nonegalitarian
justice, of allowing all eleven survivors (or, indeed, any more than one of
them) to drown. Nonegalitarian justice demands that each survivor be treated
in accordance with these (and any other) relevant criteria. And these criteria,
like (by hypothesis) all other relevant ones, apply equally to each survivor,
with equal weight. Thus, nonegalitarian justice demands that each survivor be
given a 10111 chance at a place in the lifeboat. The survivor who draws the
short straw has therefore, by the dictates of nonegalitarian justice, become
unequally or dissimilarly situated to the other ten survivors. It is thus
consistent with, and demanded by, nonegalitarian justice that the unlucky
survivor be denied a place in the lifeboat. 58
The second explanation is a simpler version of the first. The relevant
outcome for each survivor is not an actual place in the lifeboat, but a chance at
a place in the lifeboat. And, because each survivor is identically situated with
respect to entitlement to a chance at a place in the lifeboat, each survivor is
independently entitled by nonegalitarian justice to receive the same chance at a
place in the lifeboat. Giving any particular survivor a greater or lesser chance
than any other would necessarily reflect the application to that survivor of
some erroneous or otherwise irrelevant criterion59 and thus would violate
nonegalitarian justice, quite apart from any considerations of prescriptive

outcome-focused conception of treatment.
56 See id.
57 See id.; Simons, supra note I, at 745-46.
58 See Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1241-42.
59 Or an erroneous failure to apply a relevant criterion, or an erroneous weighing of the
relevant criteria. Unless I indicate otherwise, for the remainder of this essay I will use the
phrase "application of an irrelevant criterion" as shorthand for all of these possible errors.
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equality.60
Simons believes that these explanations, which purport to rely entirely on
nonegalitarian justice and not at all on prescriptive equality or any other
comparative norm, are inadequate: "[T]he supposedly 'nonegalitarian'
principles that Peters invokes to justify saving some, but not all, tum out to be
egalitarian: each sailor should have an equal (10/11) chance for a place in the
lifeboat."61 Precisely why Simons thinks the outcome can only be explained
using comparative norms is unclear, but I suspect Simons has in mind an
argument along the following lines. In the lifeboat hypothetical, the treatment
to which each person is entitled is contingent upon the treatment to which
others are entitled; if ten other survivors did not each have an entitlement to a
place in the lifeboat, each survivor would be entitled to a guaranteed place.
Thus each person's right to a 10/11 chance at a place in the lifeboat is
comparative, because it depends upon how others are entitled to be treated.
The problem with this argument is similar to the difficulty with Simons'
critique of the "single person reductio" interpretation of antidiscrimination
norms. First, Simons misinterprets the descriptive fact that all eleven survivors
cannot fit in the lifeboat as a normative requirement that each survivor's
treatment be made. contingent upon the treatment given the others. As a
description of the physical world, it is true in our hypothetical that all eleven
survivors cannot be given a place in the lifeboat-that one survivor must
drown if any are to live. In a sense this physical fact is "comparative," because
it reflects the physical scarcity of the resource that must be distributed; each
person's ability to acquire the resource depends upon the existence of others
and their ability to acquire it. And because this fact exists in the physical
world, the fact surely is relevant, under a reasonable conception of
nonegalitarian justice, to the appropriate treatment that should be given each
survivor. But the fact that the appropriate (or just) treatment of each survivor
depends to some extent on the presence and entitlements of others does not
mean that each survivor has an entitlement to something because the other
survivors are entitled to it. A comparative right, remember, is a right "the
point of which is to equalize the treatments of different persons or to create
some other relative relationship in those treatments."62 But the point of giving
each survivor a 10111 chance at a place in the lifeboat is not to create (or
maintain) some relative relationship among the treatments given to the

60 See Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1240-41. Note that by this analysis, the case
does not really involve a scarce indivisible resource. Either the resource to which everyone
is entitled is a 10111 chance at a place in the lifeboat, in which case it is not scarce, or it is an
11111 chance (i.e., a guarantee) of a place in the lifeboat, in which case it is scarce but
divisible (by reducing the amount given to each person by 1111).
61 Simons, supra note I, at 746. I have added the italics to the word "equal" in this quote
to underscore what I believe is Simons' mistaken emphasis on the equality of outcome the
hypothetical requires. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
62 Simons, supra note I, at 709 (emphasis added).
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survivors; the point, rather, is simply to achieve the best result possible under a
reasonable conception of nonegalitarian justice-to give each survivor the
greatest possible chance of continued survival, taking into account the fact that
one of them must drown.
To illustrate this conclusion, imagine that one of the eleven survivors is
unjustly denied a fair 10/11 chance at a place in the lifeboat; let us suppose the
others don't like him because he is a Yankees fan, and so they gang up on him
and force him away from the boat. What now becomes of the entitlements of
the remaining ten survivors to places in the lifeboat?63 If an (equal) chance at a
place in the lifeboat truly were a comparative right, the point of which is to
make each survivor's treatment in some way contingent on that given to others,
we would expect that each of the remaining survivors' entitlements to a place
in the boat would be diminished by the fact that one of them has now been
denied a place. But in fact we are likely to believe that the opposite is true; the
elimination of one competitor has not somehow reduced each remaining
survivor's entitlement, and in fact it has enhanced each remaining survivor's
entitlement to the point where each now can be guaranteed a place in the boat.
Or perhaps the comparative right at issue is an "impure" equality right, such
that it can only be vindicated by "leveling Up";64 if so, then the fact that one
survivor has been treated worse than he or she deserves would not diminish the
entitlements of the other survivors. But the same point can be made by
imagining an unjust beneficial treatment.
Suppose one survivor, the
strongest,65 leaps into the lifeboat and declares he will not be forced out,
whether or not he draws the short straw. The others are too weak to challenge
him and so must accept the fact of only nine remaining places in the boat. If
the chance at a place in the boat were a true comparative right, then we would
expect that each remaining survivor's entitlement would be enhanced by the
fact that one of them has been (wrongly) guaranteed a place. Again, however,
the opposite is likely to be true: We are not likely to believe that any of the
remaining survivors suddenly has a greater entitlement to a chance at
continued survival, and indeed the law of numbers now tells us that each
remaining survivor's chance has been reduced, from 10/11 to 9/10.
The fact, then, that the appropriate treatment of each survivor pursuant to
nonegalitarian justice is defined in part by the scarcity of the resource being
distributed-and thus by the fact that others have competing entitlements to
that resource-does not mean that any survivor has a comparative right to be
treated the same way any other survivor has been treated. It means only that
the just treatment of each individual survivor depends upon the physical

63 Let us suppose, perhaps somewhat unrealistically, that by mistreating the eleventh
survivor in this way, the ten remaining survivors have not thereby altered their moral
entitlements to a place in the boat.
64 See Simons, supra note 1, at 715-20.
65 But suppose, again, that his strength does not give him a greater moral entitlement to a
place in the boat than anyone else.
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limitations on outcomes presented by the real world. 66
Simons' erroneous derivation of a comparative right from the descriptive
fact of scarcity call be seen as a manifestation of his reliance on an outcomefocused conception of treatment. Giving each shipwreck survivor a 10/11
chance at a place in the lifeboat does indeed subject each of them to the same
outcome. 67 But this is beside the point. The point is that equality of outcomes
is the only way to implement just treatment, holistically conceived-treatment,
that is, according to all and only the relevant criteria that are independently
applicable to each survivor. A focus only on outcomes conceals the causes of
those outcomes, which are distributions to each person of a benefit or a burden
only according to the reasons dictated by nonegalitarian justice.

C. "Precedential Equality" and the Intermediate Perspective
Simons contends that prescriptive equality, as I have defined it, should be
labeled
"precedential" equality because "it presupposes the historical
successive treatments of at least two different individuals,"68 that is, it operates
only when one person already has received an incorrect treatment. So limited,
Simons asserts, prescriptive/precedential equality "is much too narrow to
express the many legitimate ways in which equality principles are employed in
legal and moral discourse."69 For one thing, Simons notes, "equality principles
can apply when a person or class has been burdened even if no other person or
class has received a lesser burden (or a greater benefit)."7o Moreover,
"equality principles can apply without regard to the historical sequence of
treatments between advantaged and disadvantaged persons or classes."71
As a preliminary matter, Simons is simply incorrect when he asserts that
prescriptive equality, as I have defined it, operates only from what one might
call an intermediate perspective, that is, after one person has received a
treatment and while the decisionmaker is deciding how to treat a second,
equally situated person. It is true that, for reasons I discuss below, I have often
stated the principle of prescriptive equality in a way that assumes this

66 Indeed, interpreting each survivor's 10111 chance at a place in the boat as a type of
comparative right would imply that any entitlement that is constrained by the entitlements of
others is a comparative right. Thus my entitlement to do as I please with my property would
be a comparative right, because it is constrained by my neighbor's entitlement to be free
from nuisances. This would be an incredibly broad conception of comparative rights, and it
would not seem consistent with Simons' own conception: Surely it is not the point of my
property right to create some relative relationship in the treatments of me and my neighbor.
67 Simons describes this as "equality of opportunity" rather than equality of outcome, see
Simons, supra note I, at 747, presumably on the theory that the ultimate "outcome" for one
unlucky person will differ from the ultimate "outcome" for all the rest.
68 [d. at 731.

69

[d.

70

[d. at 732.
[d.

71
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intermediate perspective: "prescriptive equality is the principle that the bare
fact that a person has been treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for
treating another, identically situated person in the same way."72 But I also
have frequently stated the principle in a way that assumes a different temporal
perspective, one situated prior to the treatment of anyone-an ex ante
perspective: "Identically situated people are entitled to be treated identically
merely because they are identically situated."73 I have also stated the principle
in a way that assumes an ex post perspective, temporally situated after the
treatments of every person who might be subject to the principle: "the
treatment of one person differently from another, identically situated person is
wrong merely because they were identically situated before their respective
treatments."74 As I have explained elsewhere, the supposed moral content of
prescriptive equality is equivalent regardless of which temporal perspective is
assumed,15
Still, Simons believes that temporal perspective matters and that viewing
prescriptive equality from other than an intermediate perspective compromises
some of my challenges to that principle's validity. Simons' first argument
along these lines is that prescriptive equality requires no sequence of
treatments at all; it can operate even when only one person is being treated, as
when an employer discharges a single employee because of his race. 76 If
norms against discrimination were norms of prescriptive equality (or of some
similar comparative right), this would indeed be true, "because the criterion
used would result in invidious unequal treatment if applied more broadly, to all
persons potentially subject to it."77 But, as I have explained above,78
antidiscrimination norms are not comparative; they are noncontingent norms of
nonegalitarian justice that apply to each individual or class quite independently
of how other individuals or classes are treated.
Simons' second argument is that adopting an intermediate temporal
perspective stacks the deck against prescriptive equality by raising the
objection that prescriptive equality requires the treatment of people according
to random chance, an unpalatable result on many conceptions of nonegalitarian
justice. 79 Simons here is referring to one of the arguments that I have made
against the validity of prescriptive equality.8o Suppose a lottery winner, Ms.
Lucky, is erroneously given an extra $100,000 by the lottery commission.

72 Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1223 (emphasis omitted); see also Peters,
Consistency, supra note 2, at 2062.
73 Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1223; see also id. at 1223-24 n.28.
74 [d. at 1223-24 n.28.
75 See id.
76 Simons, supra note 1, at 732.
77 [d. (emphasis in original).
78 See supra section III.A.
79 See Simons, supra note I, at 733-34.
80 See Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1252-53.
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After this occurs, an identically situated winner, Mr. Unlucky, appears and
similarly demands an extra $100,000 on a theory of prescriptive equality-on
the grounds, that is, that identically situated Ms. Lucky has been given that
(erroneous) benefit. If the lottery commission accedes to Mr. Unlucky's
wishes, its treatment of him has been dictated by the force of happenstance,
nothing more-by the arbitrary fact that Mr. Unlucky was not the first to
collect his lottery winnings. If one holds a conception of nonegalitarian justice
by which chance is not normally a valid criterion of treatment (as I suspect
many do), then Mr. Unlucky has been treated unjustly (although to his benefit).
According to Simons, this argument would not apply if the principle of
prescriptive equality were viewed from another temporal perspective-ex ante,
before either lottery winner has received his or her award. 81 Viewed ex ante,
prescriptive equality simply tells us that both Ms. Lucky and Mr. Unlucky are
entitled to receive the same amount; the sequence in which their respective
winnings will be awarded has nothing to do with it.
But this objection misses the point of adopting an intermediate temporal
perspective in assessing the lottery hypothetical (and indeed in assessing the
validity of prescriptive equality more generally). The intermediate perspective
allows us to distill the demands of prescriptive equality from demands that
might independently be imposed by rules of nonegalitarian justice. To
illustrate, suppose that we take an ex ante perspective, prior to the distribution
of lottery winnings to either Ms. Lucky or Mr. Unlucky. Applied at this point
in time, prescriptive equality would tell us nothing more than we already know
from applying the (nonegalitarian) rules of the lottery82: that each of Ms.
Lucky and Mr. Unlucky is entitled to receive the exact amount payable to the
holder of a winning ticket, nor more and no less. Whether prescriptive equality
gives us an additional reason to pay each winner the same amount seems
irrelevant, because we don't need an additional reason; nonegalitarian justice
(i.e., the rules of the lottery) already gives us all the reason we need. 83

81 See Simons, supra note 1, at 733-34. Simons quite properly does not consider the ex
post perspective, after both winners have received their awards. Prescriptive equality would
have no normative significance from a true ex post perspective--one from which it is
impossible to go back and modify the treatments given to either winner-precisely because
it could not tell us anything important about what to do or not to do. An ex post perspective
from which it is possible to go back and modify treatments, of course, would merely be
another version of an intermediate perspective.
82 Although it might seem strange to classify lottery rules as rules of nonegalitarian
"justice," I mean my definition of justice to encompass such rules, and indeed any rules or
norms other than those dictated by prescriptive equality.
83 Prescriptive equality might be thought to have some force in this ex ante position, in
the sense that it might make the decisionmaker more vigilant about avoiding erroneous
treatments, because he or she knows that giving an erroneous benefit to one person might
mean giving the same erroneous benefit to another person. Normatively, however, it is
difficult to see how this recognition changes the calculus of how the decisionmaker should
behave. The decisionmaker, remember, already is under a duty to give each person the
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Only from the intermediate perspective does prescriptive equality have real
bite; only then does it tell us to do something we would not otherwise be
obligated to do. At the intermediate perspective, one person (Ms. Lucky)
already has been treated wrongly by being given an erroneous benefit. The
question now is how to treat another, identically situated person (Mr.
Unlucky), and prescriptive equality purports to give us at least a reason for
Only from the
giving him the same (otherwise erroneous) benefit.
intermediate perspective is the normative claim of prescriptive equality
distinctive and salient.
Thus it is unavailing to object84 that the happenstance problem arises only
when prescriptive equality is viewed from the intermediate perspective. That
perspective is the only real place from which to view prescriptive equality.
Viewed ex ante (or, for that matter, ex post85), prescriptive equality cannot act
normatively at all; it cannot tell anyone to do anything he or she wouldn't
otherwise be required to do.
Here again we return to the notion of an holistic conception of treatment.
Both reasons and outcomes are important on such a conception. As such, it is
important (or can be, under many conceptions of justice) whether a person is
being treated according to random chance, even if that treatment involves a
beneficial outcome for the recipient. This fact underwrites the happenstance
objection to prescriptive equality; it suggests that in demanding equal
outcomes, prescriptive equality may be demanding treatment according to
unjust reasons. But what outcome a person receives also is important, and
indeed, a treatment requires some outcome. Merely thinking bad thoughts
about someone is not "treating" that person. Thus prescriptive equality has no
normative operation-it provides no reason for treatment-unless it produces,
or pushes toward, an outcome that would not otherwise obtain. This fact

correct treatment by whatever nonegalitarian rules apply. If the threat of having to
distribute an erroneous benefit equally is enough, ex ante, to give the decision maker an
additional reason to comply with this preexisting duty, then it seems likely that, at the
intermediate position, the cost of distributing an erroneous benefit to a second person would
outweigh the reason given by prescriptive equality for doing so. In other words, in any case
where the costs of compliance with prescriptive equality would be so high as to give the
decisionmaker an additional reason, ex ante, to comply with his or her existing duty to treat
each person correctly, it is unlikely that the decisionmaker would comply with prescriptive
equality at the intermediate position-and thus prescriptive equality can provide no
additional reason ex ante for the decisionmaker to comply with his or her duty.
But suppose I am wrong about this. In that case, the happenstance objection would apply
to the ex ante perspective just as it applies to the intermediate perspective, because in
treating the potential demands prescriptive equality might make from the intermediate
perspective as an additional reason for action ex ante, a decisionmaker simply is
incorporating the problem of random sequence into his or her ex ante decision regarding
how to treat people.
84 Wrongly, in any case; see supra note 83.
85 Provided that it is a true ex post perspective; see supra note 81.
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explains why only the intermediate perspective is a meaningful angle from
which to assess the supposed normative validity of prescriptive equality.86
D. The "Duty of Equal Respect and Concern"

Most of Simons' article consists either of description of the formal operation
of norms of equal treatment, however grounded, or of critique of arguments
against a deontological norm of equal treatment. Simons does, however,
briefly make a positive argument for a deontological egalitarian norm. He
argues in section II.D that such a norm can take the form of, or be grounded in,
"the fundamental duty of equal respect and concern."87 Simons notes that
some version of this duty is recognized by otherwise widely variant
philosophical approaches, including those of Ronald Dworkin88 and Robert
Nozick. 89 Is Simons correct that recognition of a "duty of equal respect and
concern" implies a norm of prescriptive equality?
As Simons notes, "[m]any different versions of this [duty] are possible"90:
A duty of equal concern might be owed only by government, or also by
employers, or indeed (in certain respects) by all persons.
The
government's duty might merely be a procedural requirement, such as
granting all its citizens an equal right to elect representatives. Or it might
include a more substantive duty to consider equally the interests of all
citizens when enacting legislation or adopting administrative rules. And
it might include a duty to provide an appropriately "neutral" or "public
interest" justification for any distinctions in treatment.91
If we generalize these different versions of the duty and place them into

86 One can imagine another, related objection to the intermediate perspective. Suppose
Mr. Unlucky picks up his lottery check first and is given the correct amount. The next day,
Ms. Lucky picks up her check and is erroneously given an extra $100,000. Prescriptive
equality might be thought to provide a reason in such a case to "go back" and give Mr.
Unlucky an additional $100,000. If so, then prescriptive equality seems to apply regardless
of who has been treated first, and the "happenstance" problem disappears.
This argument is easily rejected, however. Mr. Unlucky may have been treated first with
respect to receipt of his original check, but he still has been treated second with respect to
receipt of the additional $100,000, the treatment that matters for prescriptive equality. The
intermediate perspective that is relevant in this case is not the point in time between Mr.
Unlucky's receipt of his original check and Ms. Lucky's receipt of the extra $100,000, but
rather the point in time between Ms. Lucky's receipt of the extra $100,000 and Mr.
Unlucky's receipt (or denial) of the same erroneous benefit. As such, if Mr. Unlucky is in
fact given the extra $100,000, his treatment still relies in part on the (random) fact of its
sequence with "respect to Ms. Lucky's.
87 Simons, supra note 1, at 720.
88 See id. (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227-28 (1977».
89 See id. (citing ROBERT NOZlCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 223 (1974».
90

91

[d.
[d.
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categories, we might get the following three types of "equal respect" norm:
RI"' A norm of equal participation in collective decisionmaking, by which
each citizen has the same entitlement to engage in collective governance
activities like voting in elections, political speech, running for office, etc.
R 2: A norm of public-regarding decisionmaking by officials, by which
officials of government (and perhaps of private collective entities, like
corporations) are required to act on considerations only of the common
good rather than of private advantage.

R3: A norm of antidiscrimination, by which persons (often, but not
always, government officials) are forbidden to distribute benefits or
burdens unequally based upon certain irrelevant criteria, such as race.
To these norms might be added a fourth that seems rather obviously suggested
by the idea of a duty of equal respect and concern:
R4 : A norm of not subjugating others to one's own ends, by which, in
Kantian fashion, one is forbidden to use others solely as means for the
attainment of one's personal goals or desires.
Let me consider in tum each of these four versions of the duty of equal respect
and concern.
Version RI , a norm of equal participation in collective decisionmaking, can
be seen to operate in what I have called elsewhere conditions of exact
sufficiency. "In conditions of exact sufficiency, more than one person is
identically entitled to a particular [resource], and there is precisely the right
amount of that [resource] available to satisfy every person's legitimate claim to
it."92 Let us assume a political system (like ours) in which every citizen
independently has a right to participate in collective decisionmaking. In such a
system, by definition, there is precisely the right amount of participation
available to satisfy every citizen's legitimate claim to participate: It is possible
to allow every citizen to participate in decisionmaking, but giving one citizen
too much participation (e.g., two votes) results in giving other citizens too little
participation (because the value of every other citizen's vote will be diluted93 ).
92 Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1244. Note that I have again substituted the word
"resource" for the original "treatment" in this quote; see supra note 55.
93 In such a system, aspects of political participation other than voting-for example,
political speech-might in fact exist in what I have called conditions offinite surplus rather
than conditions of exact sufficiency. In conditions of finite surplus, there is more than
enough of a particular resource to go around, but its supply is finite, such that at some point
giving too much of the resource to one person necessitates giving too little to someone else.
See Peters, Equality, supra note 2, at 1245. Political speech might be seen to exist in
conditions of finite surplus, in the following sense. Giving slightly too much political
speech to one person might not affect the value of the speech of others, because their speech
might remain persuasive enough to compete. But giving way too much political speech to
one person might result in drowning out the speech of others, diminishing its value.
Up to the point at which giving too much political speech to one person necessitates
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Such a system, then, exists in a condition of exact sufficiency with respect to
the right of political participation.
I have attempted elsewhere to demonstrate that prescriptive equality has no
operation in conditions of exact sufficiency,94 and I will summarize that
argument only briefly here in the context of the right to vote. In a system like
our own, each citizen is equally entitled to vote by principles of nonegalitarian
justice (as codified in a constitution and statutes). If entitlement to vote is
distributed unequally-if, for instance, one person or class of persons is given
two votes while others have only one-then both the advantaged person or
class and the disadvantaged persons or classes necessarily are being treated
according to an irrelevant criterion. We know this is so because if all and only
the relevant criteria, correctly weighed, were applied to each citizen, each
would be given the same entitlement to vote; the fact that one citizen or class
has been given a greater entitlement therefore must mean that an irrelevant
criterion has been applied in distributing voting rights. And, on an holistic
conception of treatment, the application of an irrelevant criterion in distributing
burdens or benefits violates nonegalitarian justice. RJ is not then a norm of
prescriptive equality; it is simply a norm of nonegalitarian justice.
Version Rz' a norm of public-regarding decisionmaking by officials, seems
to have very little connection at all to the idea of equal treatment; it can be
explained in convincing terms that are entirely noncomparative. Such a norm
might reflect a consequentialist strategy for producing the best possible public
decisions by avoiding the taint of self-interest in the decisionmaking process.
Along similar lines, it might reflect a special duty assumed by those who
accept public office, a duty to subjugate their own interests to those of their
constituents. Such explanations are not even deontological, much less
comparatively so.
We might attempt to explain Rz in deontological egalitarian terms, however.
Government is in the business of allocating finite resources. A government
official who makes decisions with the purpose or effect of allocating resources
to himself (or his friends, supporters, etc.) necessarily deprives others of them.
R2 might be understood as a prohibition on unequal distribution of finite
resources, operative in the special case where the person doing the distributing
(the government official) is also the beneficiary of the unequal distribution.
Viewed this way, R2 operates either in conditions of exact sufficiency, like
Rp or in what I have called conditions of scarcity.95 Conditions of exact
giving too little to others (what I have called the contingency point, see id.), political speech
would exist in conditions of infinite supply, see id. I have argued extensively elsewhere that
prescriptive equality has no validity in conditions of infinite supply, see id. at 1245-54, and I
will not repeat those arguments here, as they are somewhat tangential to my main points.
After the contingency point, political speech would exist in conditions of exact sufficiency,
and my arguments against the validity of prescriptive equality in such conditions (rehearsed
in the text here) would apply.
94 See id. at 1243-45.
9S See id. at 1232-43.
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sufficiency and conditions of scarcity are similar-they are both types of what
I have called conditions of competition96-and the same basic analysis
demonstrates that, in both types of condition, nonegalitarian justice, rather than
prescriptive equality, does all the work. Again, I have applied that analysis
extensively elsewhere, and I will not rehearse it here. Suffice it to say that in
all conditions of competition, the wrongness of unequal treatment stems from
the application to each person being treated of one or more irrelevant criteria,
which is a violation of nonegalitarian justice, not of prescriptive equality.
Even charitably construed to imply a norm of equal treatment, then, R2 is not a
norm of prescriptive equality.
I have already dealt with version R 3 , a norm of antidiscrimination, in section
III.A, above. For the reasons I explained there, antidiscrimination norms are
not norms of prescriptive equality, or indeed any type of comparative norm.
Version R 4 , the Kantian norm against subjugating others to one's own ends,
might be seen as an egalitarian norm in the same sense that R/ and R2 might be:
as a norm requiring equal distribution of competitive resources. The resource
relevant to R4 is something like personal autonomy-in Kant's words, the right
to "seek [one's] happiness in whatever way [one] sees fit."97 One who
subjugates another to one's own ends, or uses another as a means to attain those
ends, essentially redistributes autonomy from the other person to him- or herself.
If, as Kant assumed, each person is identically entitled to autonomy, then this
forced redistribution necessarily violates nonegalitarian justice, because it treats
the subjugated person according to some irrelevant criterion (his relative
physical weakness, perhaps). As such, R4 also is a norm of nonegalitarian
justice, not of prescriptive eqUality.
The duty of equal respect and concern, then, does not entail egalitarian justice,
at least not in any of the three iterations in which Simons offers it or in the fourth
Kantian version that it readily suggests. The duty simply implies that all people,
as people, have equal entitlements of justice to certain resources-political
participation, perhaps, or autonomy. As such, giving more of such resources to
one person than to another violates nonegalitarian justice, because it treats people
according to some irrelevant criterion. But the duty is not comparative; its point
is not to equalize the distribution of resources or to create some other relative
relationship between the treatments given different people. Its "point" is
simply to treat each person according to a particular conception of
nonegalitarian justice.
CONCLUSION

Professor Simons' The Logic of Egalitarian Nonns is wide-ranging, and so
to an extent has been this responsive essay. I have tried to organize the essay
See id. at 1232.
97 Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: "This May be True in Theory, but it Does Not
Apply in Practice," reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 74 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991).
96
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around one major and one minor theme. The minor theme, pursued in Part I,
has been the difference between consequentialist and deontological
justifications of equal treatment and the centrality of the latter to many or most
egalitarian claims. Simons is correct that I have attacked only deontological
equality, but I believe he is mistaken to suggest that this is an artificially
narrow target.
The major theme, which flows to some extent from the minor one, has been
the difference between two alternative conceptions of what it means to "treat"
people in a morally meaningful way, along with some of the implications for
prescriptive equality that flow from that difference. In Part II, I described each
conception of treatment-the outcome-focused and the holistic-and explained
why a deontological egalitarian must adopt the holistic conception. In Part III,
I assessed four of Simons' arguments in defense of prescriptive equality,
concluding that each of them is fatally flawed and suggesting that the flaws
frequently connect with a failure to adopt the holistic conception of treatment
or from a misunderstanding of the nature and implications of that conception.
In critiquing Simons' arguments, many of which are themselves critiques of
my own, I perhaps have not given sufficient recognition to all that I think is
valuable in The Logic of Egalitarian Norms (and there is a good deal). Much
of Simons' article does in fact focus on the logic of norms of equal treatmenton the mechanics of how such norms, assuming they exist and regardless of
how they may be grounded, can or must operate in particular contexts of moral
and legal reasoning. This descriptive portion of the article is enormously
valuable, and indeed it may be the most comprehensive positive analysis of
egalitarian reasoning since Peter Westen last wrote on the subject.
In my view, however, Simons runs into trouble when he tries to ground
norms of equal treatment in a deontological principle or right. No such
principle or right exists, and speaking and thinking as if one did often confuses
matters. Race discrimination, for example, is wrong because it involves
treating someone--doling out a benefit or a burden to that person-based on
the irrelevant fact of that person's skin color. Period. Talk of "stigmas" and of
"leveling down" distracts us from the real problem; it suggests that it is okay to
deny someone a benefit based on race so long as we deny that benefit to
everybody, and so long as that person doesn't know race is a motivating factor
(and thus isn't subjected to a "stigma"). By this way of thinking, we can close
public swimming pools rather than open them to all, because in doing so we
are treating people "equally." Worse, we can operate separate systems of
public schools for black and white students, so long as the educational quality
really is equal and so long as nobody feels overly stigmatized by it. That, after
all, is equality. But it is not justice. I suspect that Professor Simons might
agree, despite the unfortunate fact that some of his arguments in The Logic of
Egalitarian Norms imply otherwise.

